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6.1  Introduction 
Years after Mexico’s 1994 exchange rate crisis important questions re- 
main regarding the country’s economic future. Some observers wonder 
whether Mexico will be able to build the bases for solid and sustainable 
development.  The historical  elusiveness of  macroeconomic  stability  in 
Mexico is at the core of this apprehension. More specifically, a number of 
observers, both in the private sector and in academic circles, have asked 
if Mexico will finally be able to escape the perverse cycle of failed stabiliza- 
tion attempts and exchange rate crises. Some have even argued that full 
dollarization is the only way  for Mexico to avoid future crises (Dorn- 
busch 1999). 
Most empirical case studies of exchange rate crises-including  those on 
the Mexican 1994 episode-have  tended to emphasize the period leading 
to the currency collapse. Issues related to the pace of credit creation, asset 
demand, and current account sustainability, among others, have figured 
prominently in these studies. Almost no work has been done, however, on 
the behavior of  the exchange rate-and  other key macroeconomic vari- 
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ables, for that matter-in  the period following a crisis. More concretely, 
very few studies have focused on the strategies followed by the monetary 
authorities to stabilize the currency in the aftermath of a major exchange 
rate collapse. And yet, as the recent crises in East Asia, Russia, and Brazil 
have made abundantly clear, it is what follows the collapse of the exchange 
rate that determines the extent of “damage” done by the crisis itself. 
This paper deals with the  1994 Mexican crisis and its aftermath. We 
concentrate on the events leading to the exchange rate collapse in Decem- 
ber of that year, and we examine the behavior of some key macroeconomic 
variables in the three years following the crisis. We are particularly inter- 
ested in addressing two main questions: First, what were the forces behind 
the apparent stability of  the peso-dollar exchange rate during 1996-97? 
And second, what was the role of Bank of Mexico (BOM) monetary policy 
in the three years following the crisis? In particular, we  are interested in 
investigating whether, as some analysts argued, the BOM’s monetary pol- 
icy  during  1996-97  was geared at maintaining a degree of nominal ex- 
change rate stability that was at odds with the requirements of a floating 
rate regime. Because the analysis in the paper covers only developments 
until the end of 1997, it does not examine whether the appointment of a 
new central bank governor in early 1998 led to a change in the BOM’s 
conduct of monetary policy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 6.2 deals with 
the period that preceded the 1994 crisis. We  provide a brief overview of 
developments in 1990-94  and discuss two (implausible) explanations for 
the collapse of the peso that, interestingly, resurfaced in the context of the 
East Asian crises of  1997-98.  We  argue that throughout  1993-94  most 
available information suggested that things in Mexico were getting rapidly 
out of hand. Most analysts, however, badly missed the magnitude of the 
disequilibrium and thus underestimated  the required adjustment in the 
nominal and real exchange rates following the abandonment  of  the ex- 
change rate band. We argue that the use of inadequate models to evaluate 
real exchange rate behavior might have been at the core of the general 
inability to gauge the seriousness of the situation. Section 6.3 is devoted 
to analyzing exchange rate behavior in the three years following the crisis 
(1995-97).  We inquire whether during this period the peso-dollar rate be- 
haved in a manner compatible with a floating exchange rate regime. Our 
analysis, based on a cross-country comparison of exchange rate volatility 
measures, as well as on the calibration of a simple monetary model, sug- 
gests that throughout most of the 1995-97  period Mexico’s exchange rate 
behavior was largely consistent with that  of (quasi-)floating rates. Our 
analysis, however, is also consistent with the notion that during this period 
the BOM took into account exchange rate developments in conducting 
monetary policy. Section 6.4 looks at this issue in greater detail and fo- 
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the question, What did the Bank of Mexico really do? Concretely, we  use 
daily data for 1996-97  to inquire whether there is evidence that when con- 
ducting monetary policy, the BOM relied on some type of feedback rule 
that took into account the behavior  of the nominal exchange rate. We 
conclude  that  notwithstanding  the  perils  of  relying  on  “noisy” high- 
frequency data, some preliminary evidence supports that view. 
6.2  The Road to Collapse: 1991-94 
In 1985, three years after coming close to default on its external debt 
and having ignited the Latin American debt crisis, Mexico embarked on 
an  ambitious market-oriented  reform  program.  Although  this  process 
started slowly, by 1989 it had gathered considerable momentum. The over- 
all program, vigorously pushed by the administration of President Salinas 
de Gortari, had four basic components:’ (1) the opening of the economy 
to international competition; (2) a comprehensive process of privatization 
and deregulation; (3) a stabilization program centered on a predetermined 
nominal exchange rate and supported by  restrictive fiscal and monetary 
policies; and (4) a broad social and economic agreement between the gov- 
ernment, the private  sector, and labor unions-known  as the Pacto- 
aimed at guiding price, exchange rate, and wage increases over loosely 
specified horizons. By  1994, the last year of the Salinas administration, 
an impressive number of reforms had been implemented, including the 
approval of the much publicized North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). 
6.2.1 
Mexico’s protracted adjustment to the external crisis of 1982 led to an 
upward ratcheting of the rate of inflation, which reached a historical high 
of 140 percent per annum in late 1987. At that point, the Mexican authori- 
ties decided to confront the inflation problem head on and designed an 
ambitious stabilization program centered on a temporary freeze of wages 
and administered prices agreed in the context of the Pacto. A few weeks 
after the launching of the program, in late February 1988, the nominal ex- 
change  rate was  fixed  and became  the main  anchor  of  the  anti-infla- 
tionary effort.*  Between 1988 and 1994 the authorities made several modi- 
fications to the exchange rate system, moving first in 1989 to a regime based 
on a preannounced rate of devaluation-where  the rate of devaluation 
was set below the (actual and expected) rate of inflation-and  in Novem- 
ber  1991 to a (narrow) exchange rate band with a sliding ceiling. From 
The Pacto, Capital Inflows, and the Exchange Rate 
1. For a detailed account of Mexico’s reform program, see Aspe (1993) and Lustig (1992). 
2.  For  comprehensive analyses of the  Mexican stabilization program  of  1988, see Vela 
See also Loser and Kalter (1992). 
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Fig. 6.1 
Sources: Banco de Mexico and IME 
Note; K. Acc. = capital flows in billions of U.S. dollars (left-hand scale). RER = real ex- 
change rate index, 1990 = 100 (righr-handscale). 
Mexico: capital flows and real exchange rate, 1980-94 
early 1992 to October 1993-when  the NAFTA controversy heated up in 
the United  States-the  nominal peso-dollar  rate was remarkably stable 
and invariably remained in the lower half of the band. Throughout most 
of this period, Mexico’s managed exchange rate regime was supported by 
prudent fiscal and monetary policies. 
The rate of inflation fell drastically (to less than 20 percent) in the first 
eighteen months of the program, but from then on the pace of disinflation 
became painfully slow. As had happened a decade earlier in Chile, and 
in other stabilization episodes, the attempt to reduce inflation using the 
exchange rate as the main nominal anchor gave rise to a substantial and 
protracted real appreciation of the Mexican peso (see fig. 6.1).’ Already 
in 1989 a number of observers argued that this trend would become unsus- 
tainable because the country lacked sufficient foreign exchange reserves to 
finance the rapidly growing current account deficit (Edwards 1998a). 
In  early  1990, after  arduous negotiations,  the  Brady debt reduction 
agreement was finally signed, the authorities accelerated the pace of their 
ambitious structural reform program, and foreign investors rediscovered 
Mexico. The ensuing surge in private capital inflows allowed Mexico to 
finance current  account  deficits on the order  of  7 percent  of  GDP in 
1992-94;  all along the real exchange rate continued to appreciate,  and 
output growth remained subdued. 
In 1992 a public debate began to take place about the consequences of 
the real appreciation that the peso had experienced since the 1988 stabili- 
zation. In early  1992 Dornbusch claimed that  “the current problem of 
3. In fig. 6.1, and throughout the paper, a decline in the real exchange rate indicates a real 
appreciation. For a comparison of the Chilean and Mexican stabilization programs, see, e.g., 
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the Mexican economy is  the overvalued exchange rate” (reproduced in 
Dornbusch  1993, 369), and in November of that year he argued that the 
daily rate of devaluation of the peso had to be tripled in 1993 to 1206 per 
day (Excelsior, 23 November  1992, 1). Also the World Bank, in its 1993 
Trend in Developing Economies, noted that in Mexico “growth recovery 
has . . . been modest. . . [an outcome that] can be traced to a combination 
of slow productivity growth, a weak US economy, tight fiscal and mone- 
tary policies, and real exchange rate appreciation” (1993, 325-30;  emphasis 
added). The Mexican authorities responded to these apprehensions with 
a rehashed version of the “Lawson doctrine” and argued that since the 
capital inflows were largely private and the fiscal accounts were in surplus, 
there was nothing to be concerned about. The authorities “substantiated” 
their view by arguing that rapid increases in productivity that would lead 
to a strong export expansion, and thus to a narrowing of the current ac- 
count, were about to take place and stressing that the exchange rate bands 
and the freely determined  interest  rates gave enough flexibility to their 
monetary policy to deal with eventual disruptions in the flow of capital 
(see BOM 1993,1994; Aspe 1993; Ortiz 1994). Confident that the approval 
of NAFTA in  late 1993 and the entry to the OECD scheduled for 1994 
were a tribute to the sound fundamentals of the Mexican economy, the 
authorities announced an economic program for 1994, a year of presiden- 
tial  elections, that  envisaged single-digit inflation, a pick-up  in output 
growth, and no fundamental change in the core macroeconomic policies. 
The size and pace of the capital inflows that Mexico had been absorbing 
since 1991 gave rise to the notion that the accompanying strengthening of 
the peso represented an “equilibrium” movement of the real exchange rate 
that was fully justified by fundamentals. The view that an increase in capi- 
tal flows will lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate is of course 
correct from  a simple theoretical  perspective. Indeed, in order for the 
transfer of resources implied by  a higher inflow of capital to become ef- 
fective, a real appreciation is required. One problem with this interpreta- 
tion, however, is that it overlooks that the rate at which capital was flowing 
into Mexico in 1992-94  (i.e., at 7 percent of GDP per annum) was clearly 
not sustainable in the long run. Considerations of external solvency and 
current  account  sustainability indicate  unequivocally that flows of  this 
magnitude at some point have to decline and that such a decline will en- 
compass a reversal of the real exchange rate appre~iation.~  Interestingly 
enough, even those analysts who recognized the unsustainable nature of 
the capital flows badly miscalculated the required real exchange rate ad- 
justment. Indeed, in early  1994 the debate among Mexico skeptics was 
whether a 20 or a 30 percent devaluation would be required to reestablish 
4. On the issue of current account sustainability, see Reisen (1995) and Milesi-Ferretti and 
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eq~ilibrium.~  Very few, if any, observers would have predicted that merely 
a year after abandoning the band, the peso would lose almost one-half of 
its value. This inability to grasp the seriousness of the Mexican situation 
(both before and after the collapse) clearly illustrates the shortcomings of 
the models commonly used by both private sector and academic analysts 
to assess the adequacy of real exchange rates. Indeed, most of these mod- 
els are strictly based on flow considerations-and  some of them are little 
more than glorified versions of purchasing power parity (PPP)-and  ig- 
nore the interaction between flows and stocks.6 Models that, on the other 
hand, pay attention to stocks in general and to the foreign demand for 
securities issued by emerging markets in particular are, in principle, better 
equipped to gauge the magnitude of the disequilibrium in circumstances 
where credibility vanishes (Calvo 1994, 1995). 
6.2.2 
Few episodes of currency crisis have received as much attention in the 
economic literature as that  of Mexico  in  1994.’ And yet, five full years 
after the fateful event, it can hardly be argued that there is consensus on 
what  caused the December  1994 devaluation  of the peso or, more pre- 
cisely, on what was the (approximate) contribution of the various hypothe- 
ses put forward to explain the occurrence, timing,  and size of the peso 
collapse. One reason for this state of affairs is that many of the earlier ac- 
counts of the Mexican crisis, in their quest to extract quick “lessons” and 
apportion  blame,  searched  for simple explanations  and sought a single 
culprit. As pointed out by Edwards et al. (1996) and others, however, this 
episode was highly complex and defies simple explanations. Indeed, as in 
the old high school exam, the answer to “What caused the Mexican cri- 
sis?” will often be “All of the above.” 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to revisit developments in Mexico 
during 1994 or to assess, with the benefit of hindsight, the relative validity 
of the various hypotheses advanced to explain the December devaluation.8 
Mexico in 1994: Two Implausible Stories 
5. See Edwards (1998a) for a detailed account of the evolution of different views on Mexico 
6. See Williamson (1995) for a discussion of some of these models. 
7. Analyses of  the Mexican crisis can be  found  in  Calvo (1995), Calvo and Mendoza 
(1996), De Long, De Long, and Robinson (1996), Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and ValdCs (1995), 
Edwards (1996, 1997), Edwards, Steiner, and Losada (1996), Gil-Diaz and Carstens (1996), 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF  1995a,  1995b), Krugman  (1995), Leiderman and 
Thorne (1995), Lustig (1995), Masson and Agenor (1996), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Rey- 
noso (1995), Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), Warner (1997), and Werner (1996). A more 
complete list would  include most of the studies contained in the July 1996 special issue of 
the International Journul of  Finance and Economics, in the July  1996 special issue of Open 
Economies Reviebv, in the November 1996 special issue of the Journal of’Internationa1 Eco- 
nomics,  and in Edwards and Naim (1997). 
8. For a comprehensive discussion of developments leading to the crisis, see  Edwards 
(1997). See also IMF (1995a, 1995b) and Sachs et al. (1996). 
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But we will take issue briefly with two rather extreme views that, interest- 
ingly, regained  prominence  during the  unfolding  of  the  1997-98  East 
Asian currency crises. The first view  ascribes a negligible role to policy 
mistakes in the unraveling of the Mexican crisis. This view, endorsed by 
the BOM since the very beginning,g attributes the occurrence (and size) 
of the peso collapse to the combination of a sequence of adverse and un- 
expected shocks (domestic and foreign) and various sources of multiple 
equilibria that gave rise to a self-fulfilling run on the currency (Reynoso 
1995; Gil-Diaz and Carstens 1996). The second view, more popular in fi- 
nancial circles, ascribes a central role to the incomplete information made 
available to foreign investors-in  particular, to the paucity and unreliabil- 
ity of official data on key economic variables-in  triggering the specula- 
tive attacks on the peso (see, e.g., Group of Thirty 1995). 
A careful examination of the Mexican episode finds no strong support 
for either of these two “stories.” Let us start with the second one. In the 
aftermath of the crisis Wall Street analysts and operators argued that the 
lack  of current  information on Mexico’s international  reserve position 
played an important role in magnifying the crisis. In fact, a post mortem 
of the crisis sponsored by  the Council on Foreign Relations and under- 
taken by an independent task force chaired by John Whitehead concluded 
that  “full financial information was  not forthcoming to all  investors” 
(Council on Foreign Relations 1996, 27). However, at least three pieces of 
evidence are at odds with the claim that markets did not know (or, more 
precisely, could not know) what was going on in Mexico in 1994. 
First, markets were fully aware (and even supportive) of what turned 
out to be a crucial modification of Mexico’s monetary policy in  1994: 
the April decision to replace maturing peso-denominated  Cetes with the 
infamous Tesobonos-short-term  dollar-linked public debt instruments. 
This strategy was quite transparent and was even commented on, matter 
of factly, in financial circles. For example, J. P. Morgan’s Emerging Mur- 
kets Outlook of 22 July  1994 noted that “half of the 28-day and 91-day 
Cetes offered were issued; the central bank would not accept the high 
yields required by the market to auction the full amount. . . . In the Teso- 
bonos auction, yields .  . . trended down modestly” (22). And on 23 July 
1994 an article in the Economist pointed out that “the central bank has 
also had to issue plenty of tesobonos-dollar-linked  bonds that are popu- 
lar with investors that worried about currency risk.”’” 
Second, the public and academic debates on the sustainability of Mexi- 
co’s external position  grew louder during the first half of  1994. For in- 
stance, in a much publicized piece prepared for the spring meetings of the 
9. See, e.g., the op-ed article by  former governor Miguel Mancera, “Don’t Blame Mone- 
10. “Pounding the Peso,” Economist, 23 July 1994, 76. 
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Brooking Institution  Economics Panel, Dornbusch and Werner (1 994) 
argued that the Mexican peso was overvalued by at least 20 percent and 
urged the Mexican authorities to rapidly find a way to address the prob- 
lem, These concerns were echoed, albeit on different grounds, by the two 
prominent discussants of the paper: Guillermo Calvo and Stanley Fischer 
(Calvo 1994; Fischer  1994). Financial  analysts were also aware that the 
U.S. authorities’ decision to extend a US$6 billion swap facility to Mexico, 
announced on 24 March, one day after the Colosio assassination, reflected 
the serious concerns those authorities had about the loss of international 
reserves that  the BOM had suffered in the tumultuous  first quarter of 
1994.  I  I 
And third, documents released to the U.S. Senate Banking Committee 
during 1995 indicate quite clearly that the US. Treasury was able to keep 
track of the evolution of Mexico’s international reserves throughout  1994 
(see D’Amato 1995). For example, a mid-May  1994 memorandum from 
Assistant Secretary Shafer pointed out that the BOM had reportedly spent 
US$10 billion since the Colosio assassination to defend the peso. Similar 
documentation shows that Treasury officials were well aware of the speed 
at which Mexico’s reserves were being depleted in the last weeks of the 
year.I2 Even  though  the  BOM  had  maintained  during  1994 its  long- 
standing practice of releasing to the public data on its international re- 
serves only three times a year (in April, October, and November) there is no 
compelling reason why diligent analysts in the private sector could not have 
produced estimates of Mexico’s international reserves as accurate as those 
of the U.S. Treasury on the basis of available information (on the stocks 
and flows of Cetes and Tesobonos, trade flows, and so on). Why so many 
of them did not, or if they did, why they did not react earlier to the deterio- 
ration  of Mexico’s external indicators remains an open question. But in 
light of the above evidence, it is hard not to conclude that until the very 
end, foreign investors simply underestimated the probability of a cri~is.’~ 
The flaws  of the first view-the  “bad luck” view-become  apparent 
when one examines the policy response to the sequence of shocks that hit 
Mexico during 1994. As noted earlier, a crucial decision in the area of 
monetary and exchange rate policy prior to the December crash was taken 
in April 1994, when the Mexican authorities, in response to the increasing 
difficulties they were facing in rolling over the country’s sizable stock of 
peso-denominated  debt at the (high) yields prevailing at the time,14 de- 
cided to stave off further rises in domestic interest rates by  substituting 
11. See, e.g.,  the front page stories in the Financial Times 26 and 28 March 1994. 
12. See, e.g., the memoranda dated 18 November and 5 December in D’Amato (1995). 
13. The results obtained by  Masson and Agenor (1996) provide further support for this 
conclusion. 
14. Interest rates on twenty-eight-day Cetes had almost doubled between February and 
mid-April 1994, when they reached a level of about 18 percent per annum in the secondary 
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dollar-linked Tesobonos for maturing Cetes while leaving intact the other 
two pillars of their monetary policy framework-that  is, the exchange rate 
band and the target for nominal base money (and, hence, the sterilization 
of reserve flows). BOM officials have argued that they had followed a simi- 
lar strategy in late 1993, when the peso came under pressure due to uncer- 
tainties about the ratification of NAFTA by  the US. Congress, and thus 
that “it was natural to follow the same strategy after the Colosio assassina- 
tion” (Gil-Diaz and Carstens  1996, 168). One problem with this line of 
reasoning, however, is that it ignores the fundamental difference between 
using debt swap operations to smooth transitory hikes in interest rates and 
using those operations to keep interest rates below their equilibrium level 
for a prolonged period of  time. The tightening of monetary conditions in 
the  United  States in  early  1994-which  raised  the  floor  for  Mexican 
rates-and  the rapid pace at which maturing Cetes were being replaced 
by Tesobonos several months after the policy had been adoptedi5  should 
have made it clear to BOM officials that their debt strategy was achieving 
the latter rather than the former. Moreover, the decision to maintain the 
course of policies unaltered after the August presidential election and after 
the internal debate that preceded the renewal of the Pacto in September 
leaves little doubt that the authorities deliberately opted for a policy stance 
that they hoped would enable them to continue lowering interest rates and 
preserve the exchange rate band. 
One can only speculate about the reasons that led the authorities to 
miss these propitious opportunities to correct the stance of monetary and 
exchange rate policy. By the third quarter of  1994, Mexican authorities 
might well have been under the impression that they had weathered the 
worst of the speculative pressures and that it was a matter of time before 
capital inflows would resume at a pace similar to that of  1992-93.  Con- 
cerns about the adverse effects that higher interest rates (or a depreciation 
of the peso) might have on the deteriorating situation of the banking sys- 
tem are also likely to have played a role;I6  indeed, the decision to preserve 
the policy stance could have reflected an attempt to buy additional time 
to work out a plan to strengthen those financial institutions considered to 
be in particularly weak positions.17  Whatever the reasons, there is no ques- 
tion that the Mexican authorities seriously underestimated the risks em- 
15. Between the end of March and the end of October 1994 the stock of Tesobonos out- 
standing increased by almost the same amount as the decline in the stock of Cetes (around 
US$I 3 billion). 
16. The preoccupation with the financial health of the recently privatized banks had begun 
in late 1992, when a significant increase in the past-due loan ratio became evident. In 1990, 
nonperforming loans-which  prevailing regulations defined as unpaid installments of princi- 
pal plus interest, rather than the total value of the loans-were  estimated to be only 2 percent 
of total loans; that ratio increased to 4.7 percent in 1992, to 7.3 percent in 1993, and to 8.3 
percent at the end of the first quarter of 1994. 
17. In fact, by  the end of June 1994 the government-owned banks had designed a debt 
relief program comprising a combination of write-offs of commercial bank past-due interest 
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bedded in their chosen course of action. It is quite a stretch to claim, as 
BOM officials have since the beginning, that this error in judgment (even if 
well intentioned) does not fall squarely in the category of policy mistakes. 
Between June and November 1994 the stock of Tesobonos outstanding 
more than doubled to a total of US$16 billion. By the end of November 
the BOM’s international reserves, at US$12.9 billion, were barely enough 
to cover 40 percent of total short-term public debt or  10 percent of total 
short-term liabilities of the banking system. The situation had long sur- 
passed the current account and peso overvaluation sphere and had all the 
makings of a major financial crisis. It took little to cross the threshold. A 
few days after President Zedillo was sworn into office (on  1 December) 
news about renewed tensions in Chiapas led to a further attack on the 
peso, and on 20 December, when international reserves had fallen to about 
US$lO billion, the authorities finally opted for a policy correction and 
lifted by  15 percent the ceiling of the exchange rate band. To  everyone’s 
surprise, the announcement of the new exchange rate ceiling was not ac- 
companied by other supportive changes in macroeconomic policies or by 
a  revision of  the macroeconomic  assumptions for  1995 that  had been 
made public a few weeks earlier. In disbelief, investors-both  foreign and 
domestic-fled,  rendering the change in policy ineffective; in one day the 
BOM lost US$4 billion in reserves. By then, the authorities realized that 
they had no alternative but to let the peso float. But the mayhem had 
just started. 
6.3  The Mexican Peso during 1995-97: 
A Freely Floating Exchange Rate? 
The behavior of the Mexican peso has been an object of interest to 
analysts and observers since the crash of December 1994. In the immedi- 
ate aftermath of the December devaluation, most discussion centered on 
the possibility that a spiraling collapse of the peso would unleash an infla- 
tionary explosion that would wreak havoc with the real economy and the 
financial system. By late 1995 several observers became wary about what 
they considered the surprising-and  some argued even unwarranted- 
stability of Mexico’s nominal exchange rate. Many analysts were particu- 
larly surprised that even though the annual inflation rate was falling rather 
slowly from its 52 percent peak in December 1995 and had remained in 
double digits during 1996-97,  the peso-dollar exchange rate by, say, mid- 
October 1997 (7.71 pesos per dollar on 21 October) was essentially at the 
same level it had been in early January 1996-see  figure 6.2A. During this 
period there seemed to be a growing consensus that the relative stability of 
the nominal exchange rate in a context of double-digit inflation was more 
the result of measures undertaken  by  the BOM-allegedly  to “smooth 
out” short-term fluctuations-than  the outcome of market forces. 
In its  3 October  1997 Emerging  Markets  Data  Watch, J. P.  Morgan The Mexican Peso in the Aftermath of the 1994 Currency Crisis  193 
6 
41  2 
B 
70 
4b 9  $8  &\  9@  +-p  *$  +.  9.1.” 
Fig. 6.2  Mexico: nominal and real exchange rates, January 1994-November  1997 
Nore: A, Pesos per U.S.  dollar. B, Real exchange rate vis-a-vis U.S.  dollar, CPI based, 1990 = 
100; increase means depreciation. 
stated that “by staying at about NP7.8 throughout 1997 so far, the peso’s 
behavior has reopened the debate on whether it is appreciating too much 
in real terms. . .  . Peso strength has gone further, and lasted longer than 
we  had envisaged [in] our earlier forecasts” (3). This influential financial 
newsletter went on to say that the surprising strength of the peso was likely 
to be the result of a deliberate BOM policy stance. Other observers went 
a step further and saw in the stability of the nominal exchange rate, and 
the associated appreciation of the real exchange rate in 1996-97 (fig. 6.2B), 
signs of  another cycle of policy-induced overvaluation of  the peso that 
could lead to yet another episode of slow growth and overborrowing cul- 
minating in a major currency crisis similar to those that had affected the 
country during the past twenty-five years. For example, the Economist ar- 
gued that the BOM policy stance toward the peso was unduly influenced 
by  political considerations: “Distrustful investors have wondered aloud 
whether the central bank-which  lost much credibility with the collapse- 
really enjoys independence. .  . . The doubters have noted that the govern- 
ment’s policy on the peso, which is theoretically free to float, has actually 
been set by a committee.”’* 
Most analysts who expressed concerns about the behavior of the Mexi- 
can peso were not explicit, however, about the counterfactual-that  is, 
about the type of behavior the peso should have exhibited if it really were 
18. “The Lingering Tequila Effect,” Economist, 14-28  March 1998, 17. 194  Sebastian Edwards and Miguel A. Savastano 
floating freely. Some could argue that the dismal performance of “tradi- 
tional”  exchange rate  models to explain  and predict  short-term  move- 
ments of floating exchange  rates in the past  two  decades (Frankel  and 
Rose 1995; Isard 1995) exempts observers from the need to provide some 
theoretical or empirical support for their concerns. We  disagree. For one 
thing, many of the worries about the real overvaluation of the peso during 
1995-97  seem to have been grounded on the notion that either some type 
of PPP adjustment or a simple flow-based real exchange rate equation- 
not too different from those used to evaluate the appropriateness of Mex- 
ico’s real exchange rate in  1993-94-provides  a reasonable yardstick to 
assess the behavior of a floating exchange rate over relatively short peri- 
ods. However, the notion that exchange rate analyses rooted in PPP are 
useful for this purpose has been flatly rejected by numerous empirical stud- 
ies (Froot and Rogoff 1995; Isard  1995). Moreover, as we  argued in the 
previous section, simple real exchange rate models that focus on flows and 
disregard  the behavior  of  stock variables  can produce  highly  mislead- 
ing estimates of the degree of real exchange rate misalignment at a particu- 
lar moment in time, especially under a floating regime. 
Twenty-five years of experience with floating exchange rates have pro- 
duced a substantial body of evidence on their short- and long-term empiri- 
cal regularities (Baillie and McMahon 1989; de Vries 1994) that cannot be 
simply dismissed when passing judgment on the evolution of a particular 
float-even  if  this happens to be the Mexican peso. The analysis in this 
section attempts to place the debate about the behavior of the Mexican 
peso during the early postcrisis period on firmer ground. Specifically, we 
explore whether-and  to what extent-the  behavior exhibited  by  Mex- 
ico’s nominal exchange rate vis-a-vis the US. dollar in 1995-97 conforms 
to the behavior of other floating rates. To address this question we conduct 
two types of exercises, one based on a cross-country comparison of simple 
measures of nominal exchange rate volatility and the other focused on the 
evolution over time of various “fundamental determinants” of the peso- 
dollar exchange rate. 
For the first exercise we  used daily data on the nominal exchange rate 
vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar of the currencies of Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Mexico and on the nom- 
inal exchange  rate vis-a-vis the German mark of the French franc, for 
the period  January  1991-November  1997 (about  1,800 observations per 
currenc~).’~  We calculated the day-to-day percentage change of the eight 
nominal exchange rates over the whole sample (fig. 6.3) and then com- 
puted, for each calendar year, two measures of  short-term volatility often 
19. The exchange rates  used for these calculations consist of  the “representative  rates” 
submitted daily by  all countries’ central banks to the Treasurer’s Department of the IMF. Japanese  yen per U.S.  dollar 
81 
Fig. 6.3  Short-term variability of selected nominal exchange rates, January 1991-November  1997 (day-to- 
day percentage changes) 
Note: Bands for each currency are set at 2 standard deviations of the daily percentage change over the sample period. Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar 
I 
French francs per deutsche mark 
81 
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used in empirical analyses of nominal exchange rates: (1) the mean abso- 
lute value of the day-to-day  percentage  change and (2) the standard de- 
viation of the (actual) day-to-day percentage change (see Baillie and Mc- 
Mahon 1989). We  also computed these two measures of volatility for the 
weekly (end of week) and monthly (end of month) percentage changes of 
the eight nominal exchange rates during the period. 
The results of these computations are presented in tables 6.1, 6.2, and 
6.3. These tables reveal  three important features of the behavior  of the 
Mexican peso during 1995-97: (1) The peso-dollar exchange rate was con- 
siderably less volatile than the other seven exchange rates in the period 
prior  to the devaluation  of  December  1994 (January  1991-November 
1994). (2) The Mexican peso exhibited the highest  degree of short-term 
volatility among this group of currencies in 1995. (3) The short-term vola- 
tility of Mexico’s nominal exchange rate was broadly in line with that of 
the other seven currencies in the last twenty-three months of the sample 
(January 1996-November  1997). The first two findings are hardly surpris- 
ing: as noted earlier, Mexico’s exchange rate system prior to the devalua- 
tion consisted of a gradually crawling band with relatively narrow margins 
in which the central bank intervened heavily to dampen (most) short-term 
fluctuations, whereas the financial mayhem that beset Mexico in the first 
quarter of 1995 was reflected primarily in wild daily gyrations in the value 
of the peso-which  were greater than 6 percent  (in both directions) on 
several occasions (fig. 6.3). The third feature, however, is quite interesting. 
According to the statistics in tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, in 1996-97 the Mexi- 
can peso was consistently more volatile than the Canadian dollar and the 
French franc and, while it was more stable than the currencies of the G-3 
and the United Kingdom (countries widely regarded as having the “clean- 
est” type of float), exhibited a degree of volatility comparable to that of 
the currencies of Australia and New Zealand (fig. 6.4).*O This evidence, 
therefore, suggests that the relative stability of Mexico’s nominal exchange 
rate in the aftermath of the 1994 crisis period was not “excessive” or un- 
usual for a floating rate. At the same time, however, the fact that the peso- 
dollar rate exhibited a degree of volatility lower than that of the cleanest 
floaters in  the group is  not inconsistent  with  the view  that  during the 
period  under  consideration  the BOM took into account,  in some way, 
the behavior  of  the nominal exchange rate  when conducting monetary 
policy. 
Of course, it is possible  that by  comparing the mean absolute values 
and standard deviations of high-frequency  exchange rate changes during 
20. We  decided to include the franc-mark exchange rate in the sample even though the 
French currency did not float freely during the period under study (but instead was linked, 
through the Exchange Rate Mechanism and monetary policy, to the evolution of the German 
mark) in order to have comparable data on a country with a managed float where exchange 
rate stability has been a primary objective of monetary policy. Table 6.1  Volatility of Daily Exchange Rates, 1991-97 
United  New 
Germany  Japan  Kingdom  Canada  Australia  Zealand  France  Mexico 
Year and Measure  (DM/US$)  (yen/US$)  (pound/US$)  (Can$lUS$)  (Au$lUS$)  (NZS/USS)  (FFrlDM)  (peso/US$) 
1991 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute % change 
Standard deviation of YO 
Maximum absolute %I 
Number of obs. with zero 
I992 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute % change 
Standard deviation of YU 
Maximum absolute YO 
Number of obs. with zero 
I993 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute '%  change 





















































0.2658  0.2510 
0.3635  0.3704 
1.9577  2.3219 
12  23 
0.2937  0.2505 
0.4188  0.3539 
2.0030  1.5042 
12  33 
0.4106  0.2634 
























































































































































































Number of obs. 
Mean absolute % change 
Standard deviation of % 
Maximum absolute YO 
Number of obs. with zero 
I997 (January-November) 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute %change 
Standard deviation of Yn 
Maximum absolute YO 
Number of obs. with zero 
1991-97b 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute % change 
Standard deviation of YO 
Maximum absolute YO 



























































0.2838  0.2477 
0.4042  0.3504 
2.1690  1.5314 
15  16 
0.4209  0.3356 
0.5726  0.4471 
2.7822  2.0083 
9  19 
0.3329  0.2610 
0.4677  0.3686 
2.7822  2.3219 

























aIncludes national holidays and other nontrading days; excludes weekends. 
bUp  to the end of November 1997. Table 6.2  Volatility of Weekly Exchange Rates, 1991-97  (end-of-week exchange rate) 
United  New 
Germany  Japan  Kingdom  Canada  Australia  Zealand  France  Mexico 
Year and Measure  (DM/US$)  (yen/US$)  (poundlUS$)  (Can$lUS$)  (Au$lUS$)  (NZWJSS)  (FFr/DM)  (peso/US$) 
1991 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute YO  change 
Standard deviation of %, 
change 
Maximum absolute YO 
change 
Number of weeks with 
zero change 
I992 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute YO  change 
Standard deviation of YO 
change 
Maximum absolute 'Xi 
change 
Number of weeks with 
zero change 
I993 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute % change 
Standard deviation of % 





























































































4.0000 Number of weeks with 
zero change 
1994 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute 'YO  change 
Excl. last two weeks 
Standard deviation of YO 
Excl. last two weeks 
Maximum absolute YO 
change 
Number of weeks with 
zero change 
1995 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute %I  change 
Standard deviation of YO 
change 
Maximum absolute YO 
change 
Number of weeks with 
zero change 
19% 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute YO  change 






0  0 
0.8317 
0  1  0  0  0  3 
52 






1.2035  1.1292  0.9341  0.5346  0.8204  0.5708  0.4624 









0  1  L 
52 













































0.7450  0.8435 Table 6.2  (continued) 
United  New 
Germany  Japan  Kingdom  Canada  Australia  Zealand  France  Mexico 
Year and Measure  (DM/US$)  (yen/US$)  (pound/US%)  (Can$/US$)  (Au$/US$)  (NZ$/US$)  (FFr/DM)  (peso/US$) 
Maximum absolute YO 
Number of weeks with 
I997 (January-November) 
Number of  obs.  48 
Mean absolute % change  1.0502  1.1412  0.9589  0.5381  0.8936  0.6955  0.1998  0.6305 
Standard deviation of % 
change  1.2782  1.5171  1.2660  0.6719  1.1224  0.9288  0.2458  1.1699 
Maximum absolute % 
change  3.2729  5.2760  4.3556  1.8926  4.0958  3.7168  0.6484  6.3722 
Number of weeks with 
1991-97' 
Number of obs.  360 
Mean absolute % change  1.1867  0.9956  1.1317  0.4895  0.7498  0.6004  0.3112  0.7085 
Standard deviation of %O 
change  1 S453  1.3090  1.5966  0.6407  0.9889  0.8017  0.4740  2.5351 
Maximum absolute YO 
change  5.3676  5.3162  1 1.3738  2.1415  4.0958  3.7168  2.3369  44.3001 
Number of weeks with 
change  2.1930  2.1091  2.7248  1.2527  2.3468  2.0616  0.7090  2.2754 
zero change  0  0  0  0  1  I  0  0 
zero change  0  0  0  0  0  2  0  2 
zero change  1  4  0  3  1  6  0  11 
"Up to the end of November 1997. Table 6.3  Volatility of Monthly Exchange Rates, 1991-97  (end-of-month exchange rate) 
United  New 
Germany  Japan  Kingdom  Canada  Australia  Zealand  France  Mexico 
Year and Measure  (DM/US$)  (yen/US$)  (pound/US$)  (Can$/US$)  (Au$lUS$)  (NZ$IUS$)  (FFrlDM)  (Peso/US$) 
1991 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute Yn  change 
Standard deviation of % 
Maximum absolute % 
Minimum absolute Yn 
1992 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute % change 
Standard deviation of % 
Maximum absolute % 
Minimum absolute YO 
I993 
Number of  obs. 
Mean absolute % change 
Standard deviation of Yn 
change 
























































1.4008  1.21 10 
1.7454  1.4713 
3.2903  3.9749 
0.0255  0.0500 
1.4079  0.9990 
1.6783  1.2895 
4.3174  2.3689 
0.0527  0.0183 
2.2055  1.1803 
2.6574  1.2989 






















0.8176 Table 6.3  (continued) 
United  New 
Germany  Japan  Kingdom  Canada  Australia  Zealand  France  Mexico 
Year and Measure  (DM/US$)  (yen/US$)  (pound/US$)  (Can$/US$)  (Au$/US$)  (NZ$/US%)  (FFrIDM)  (PesoRJS$) 
Minimum absolute YO 
I994 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute YO  change 





Maximum absolute YO 
change 
Minimum absolute Yn 
change 
I995 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute '% change 
Standard deviation of YO 
Maximum absolute  O/U 




0.8733  0.1202  0.0135  0.0787  0.6992  0.1846  0.0807  0.0515 
12 
1.6826  I .7654  1.3936  1.0605  1.7563  1.5685  0.2917  5.3873 
1.4999 
1.8524  2.3000  1.8476  1.3314  1.9837  1.4846  0.3270  13.766 1 
2.0748 













0.0251  0.0322 
12 































Number of obs. 
Mean absolute YO  change 
Standard deviation of YU 
Maximum absolute YO 
Minimum absolute YU 
I997 (January-November) 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute '% change 
Standard deviation of '%, 
change 
Maximum absolute YO 
change 
Minimum absolute YU 
change 
I 991-97a 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute YO  change 
Standard deviation of 'YO 
Maximum absolute '% 
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Australian dollars per U.S.  dollar 
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Mexican  pesos per U.S. dollar 
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Fig. 6.4 
November 1997 (day-to-day percentage changes) 
Short-term variability of nominal exchange rates, January 1996- 
specific calendar years we are imposing arbitrary restrictions on the distri- 
bution of nominal exchange rates that prevent us from detecting impor- 
tant peculiarities  of the behavior  of the Mexican peso. In particular, it 
may be the case that the volatility measures of the Mexican peso for the 
years 1996-97  (and even 1995) are unduly influenced by large “volatility 
clusters” (de Vries 1994) and that, except for a few days (or weeks) with 
very large exchange rate fluctuations, the nominal peso-dollar rate is “ex- 
cessively” stable for the most part of the year. To explore whether this is 
in fact the case, we  broke the sample for the years 1995-97  into “turbu- The Mexican Peso in the Aftermath of the 1994 Currency Crisis  209 
lent” and “calm” periods for each exchange rate. Specifically, we  used the 
day-to-day percentage changes to construct monthly measures of volatility 
for each currency and ranked them in descending order. We then used the 
observations from the three months of each year when volatility was high- 
est for each exchange rate to compute the volatility measures for the turbu- 
lent period and the observations from the other nine months to obtain the 
corresponding measures for the calm period of the year. The outcomes of 
these calculations are reported in table 6.4. Overall, the results are quite 
similar to those we  obtained using all the observations for each calendar 
year: the Mexican peso still stands out as the most volatile currency in this 
group in 1995 (in both the turbulent and calm periods), and perhaps more 
important, the volatility of the peso-dollar exchange rate continues to be 
higher than that of the Canadian dollar and the French franc-and  simi- 
lar in magnitude to that of the New Zealand dollar-in  the calm periods 
of 1996-97.  Hence, these findings support our earlier conclusion: the rela- 
tive stability exhibited by  the Mexican peso over many intervals during 
1996-97  is not at odds with the behavior of exchange rates in other coun- 
tries generally regarded as having (some variant of) a floating exchange 
rate arrangement.21 
One aspect of the behavior of the Mexican peso captured by the indica- 
tors in table 6.4, however, seems rather peculiar, namely, the marked shift 
in the (relative) degree of volatility between turbulent and calm subperi- 
ods. In fact, unlike the other currencies, which more or less preserve their 
pecking order in the scale of volatility in both subperiods, the peso-dollar 
exchange rate jumps ahead in the scale of volatility in turbulent periods. 
Indeed, table 6.4 shows that the degree of volatility of the peso-dollar rate 
during these subperiods was comparable to that of the three most volatile 
exchange rates in the sample (i.e., the mark-dollar, yen-dollar, and pound- 
dollar rates). These large shifts in the (relative) degree of volatility across 
subperiods22  might reflect a different (“atypical”) underlying distribution 
of nominal exchange rate changes for the Mexican peso or differences in 
the relation between the nominal exchange rate and other financial vari- 
ables (e.g., interest rates) in the case of Mexico. We will come back to this 
issue later in the paper. 
For  the second  exercise we  followed the methodology developed  by 
Rose (1994) and Flood and Rose (1995) to analyze the relation between 
exchange rate  volatility and macroeconomic volatility  across exchange 
regimes.  The  methodology helps  to ascertain  whether  the  increase in 
21. Werner (1997) reaches a similar conclusion. 
22. These shifts are also clear when one compares the ratio between the measures of vola- 
tility in turbulent and in calm periods. With the exception of Mexico, these ratios are quite 
similar across countries and over time (on the order of 1.5 to 1.6-and  none, except for two, 
greater than 2). In the case of Mexico, however, these ratios are much larger than 2 in 1995 
and 1997, and on the order of 1.8 in 1996. Table 6.4  Volatility of Daily Exchange Rates: “Turbulent” and “Calm” Periods, 199597 
United  New 
Germany  Japan  Kingdom  Canada  Australia  Zealand  France  Mexico 
Year and Measure  (DM/US$)  (yen/US$)  (pound/US$)  (Can$/US$)  (Au$lUS$)  (NZ$lUS$)  (FFrlDM)  (peso/US$) 
I995 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute YO  change 
Standard deviation of YO 
change 
Three most volatile 
months8 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute Yn 
change 
Standard deviation of 
YO  change 
Other 9 months 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute YO 
change 



































































Number of obs. 
Mean absolute YO  change 
Standard deviation of % 
change 
Three most volatile 
monthsb 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute 'YO 
change 
Standard deviation of 
YO  change 
Other 9 months 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute % 
change 
Standard deviation of 
% change 
1997" 
Number of obs. 
Mean absolute YO  change 
Standard deviation of Yn 
change 
Three most volatile 
monthsd 
Number of obs. 
(continued) 
260 












































































0.8485  0.6086 
63  64  61  65  64  67  66  63 Table 6.4  (continued) 
United  New 
Germany  Japan  Kingdom  Canada  Australia  Zealand  France  Mexico 
Year and Measure  (DM/US$)  (yen/US$)  (pound/US$)  (Can$/US$)  (Au$lUS$)  (NZ$/USS)  (FFr/DM)  besolus$) 
Mean absolute % 
Standard deviation of 
change  0.621  1  0.705 1  0.5370 
'%  change  0.7420  0.9781  0.6967 
Other 8 months 
Number of obs.  174  173  176 
Mean absolute YO 
Standard deviation of 
change  0.4205  0.4469  0.3585 









0.361  1 
0.4784 
0.4369  0.2402  0.6449 
0.5674  0.3032  1.5691 
70  171  174 
0.2956  0.1095  0.2246 
0.3895  0.1502  0.3077 
.'Germany: March, May, and June. Japan: March, April, and September. United Kingdom: February, March, and May. Canada: March, September, and October. 
Australia: February, May, and October. New Zealand: February, March, and April. France: March, May, and October. Mexico: January, February, and March. 
bGermany: January, February, and December. Japan: January, February, and April. United Kingdom: May, November, and December. Canada: January, Febru- 
ary, and July. Australia: July, November, and December. New Zealand: March, October, and December. France: January, July, and November. Mexico: January, 
June, and October. 
cJanuary to November. 
"Germany: January, August, and November. Japan: May, June, and August.  United Kingdom: February, August, and November. Canada: January, May, and 
June. Australia: March, October, and November. New  Zealand: July, August, and October. France: August, September, and October. Mexico: February, October, 
and November. The Mexican Peso in the Aftermath of the 1994 Currency Crisis  213 
exchange rate volatility brought about by a switch from a fixed (managed) 
to a floating exchange rate regime is associated with a corresponding in- 
crease in macroeconomic  volatility. To  the extent that  this is the case, 
“standard” macroeconomic fundamentals can be said to account for the 
high exchange rate volatility that characterizes floating rates (as with the 
Mexican peso in  1995-97).  Conversely, if  macroeconomic fundamentals 
do not change systematically across exchange regimes, one would have to 
conclude that the sources of the increased exchange rate volatility in  a 
float are not macroeconomic in nature (this is, in fact, the main conclusion 
of Flood and Rose’s analysis of the behavior of the nominal exchange rates 
of eight OECD economies before and after the breakdown of  Bretton 
Woods). The methodology is useful for identifying potential fundamental 
determinants of exchange rates and is grounded on sound economic intu- 
ition. Simply put, it combines the fact that theoretical models typically 
assume that there exists a regime-invariant (linear) link between (nominal) 
exchange rates and “fundamentals” with the empirical observation that 
the conditional volatility of exchange rates rises sharply whenever a pre- 
viously fixed or managed exchange rate is allowed to float. The testable 
corollary of these two premises is that any variable considered a poten- 
tially valid fundamental determinant of exchange rates also has to exhibit 
a significant increase in its conditional volatility with the switch from a 
fixed to a floating exchange regime. 
The mechanics of the exercise are fairly straightforward. In the case of 
the simple flexible price monetary model of the exchange rate, the exercise 
starts from the three standard equations: (a) a structural money market 
equilibrium condition for the domestic country, 
(1)  m,  - P, =  PY, - d,  +  E,, 
where m, is the (natural logarithm of the) money supply in period  t,  p,  is 
the (log of the) price level, y,  is (the log of) real income, i, is the nominal 
interest  rate,  E, is a money demand shock, and a  and P are structural 
parameters;  (b)  a  comparable  equilibrium  condition  for  the  foreign 
country, 
that assumes elasticities for real income and the interest rate equal to those 
of the home country; and (c) the assumption that PPP holds, at least up 
to a disturbance, 
(2)  P, - P:  =  e,  +  v,, 
where e, is the (log of the) nominal exchange rate (units of domestic cur- 
rency per unit of foreign currency) and v,  is a stationary disturbance. It 214  Sebastian Edwards and Miguel A. Savastano 
then  combines  (a)  through  (c)  to  obtain  the  familiar  exchange  rate 
equation: 
(3)  e, = (m  -  m*),  -  p(y -  y*), + a(i -  i*),  -  (E -  E*), -  v,, 
which can also be expressed as 
(3’)  el - a(i -  i*)l  = (m  -  m*),  -  p(y -  y*), -  (E -  E*), -  v,. 
In the case of other structural exchange rate models (e.g., sticky price 
models, portfolio balance models, and currency substitution models) the 
procedure would be similar, namely, obtain the reduced-form relation for 
the nominal exchange rate implied by the model, and then exploit the fact 
that the left-hand side and right-hand side of that relation represent, in 
theory, alternative ways of measuring the same latent variable: the “funda- 
mental determinants” of the exchange rate. For example, Flood and Rose 
(1995) explicitly consider the alternative case of a sticky price model a la 
Frankel (1979) that relaxes the PPP assumption. Another alternative that 
would seem relevant for small developing economies-such  as Mexico- 
would be a model that relaxes the assumption that monetary services are 
provided only by the domestic currency and, hence, allows a role for cur- 
rency substitution in the determination of the exchange rate. One problem 
with these alternatives is that their corresponding reduced-form equations 
have multiple empirical specifications and therefore it is far more difficult 
to rely on the empirical literature to make reasonable assumptions about 
the values of the structural parameters necessary to implement the proce- 
dure. Thus, to simplify matters, and as a first approximation, we  decided 
to stick to the familiar flexible price monetary model. 
Flood and Rose (1995) call the left-hand side of equation (3’) the virtual 
fundamentals (VF): 
(4)  VF =  el - a(i - i*),, 
and the first two terms of the right-hand side the “traditional fundamen- 
tals” (TF): 
(5)  TF  (m  - m*),  - p(y - Y*),; 
they  also consider a variant  of equation (5) that includes the term for 
money disturbances  and call  it  “augmented traditional  fundamentals” 
(ATF): 
(6)  ATF G  (m  - m*),  - p(v - v*), - (E - E*),, 
which, using equation (3), can be shown to be equal to 
(6’)  ATF = (p  - p*), - &(i  - i*),, The Mexican Peso in the Aftermath of the 1994 Currency Crisis  215 
The thrust of this approach consists of comparing the time-series char- 
acteristics of VF, TF, and ATF (the only difference between the latter two 
being the money disturbance term (E -  E*),).  As noted above, the under- 
lying hypothesis is that if the model is a useful approximation of reality, 
virtual  and traditional  fundamentals  should  exhibit  similar  time-series 
properties. If they do not, then either the model is faulty, measurement 
errors are pervasive, or both. To deal with the possible nonstationarity of 
the data, Flood and Rose (1995) propose using the conditional volatility 
(i.e., the standard deviations of the first differences of VF, TF, and ATF) 
as the metric for the comparison. They also stress that the methodology 
does not require strong assumptions about the processes of the forcing 
variables (including, in particular,  assumptions about exogeneity); all it 
requires, aside from the raw economic data, is “reasonable”-that  is, em- 
pirically sound-assumptions  about the values of the structural parame- 
ters a  and p. 
To  apply this methodology  to the peso-dollar exchange rate we  used 
monthly data for Mexico and the United States for the period January 
1991-October  1997.23  We assumed that Mexico was the domestic country 
and used consumer price indexes (CPIs) to measure prices, narrow money 
(Ml) data to measure the money supply, industrial production indexes as 
a proxy for real income, and the return on one-month treasury  bills as 
interest rates.24  All the series were transformed by natural logarithms, ex- 
cept for the interest rates-which  were measured as nominal rates divided 
by 100. Following Flood and Rose (1995), we chose a  = 0.5 and p = 1.0 
as the benchmark values in the computation  of VF, TF, and ATF and 
checked the sensitivity of the results to two alternative values for a  (0.1, 
1.0) and p (0.5, 1.5). 
Figure 6.5 shows the plots of the levels (left) and first differences (right) 
of the three measures of the fundamentals of the peso-dollar exchange rate 
using the benchmark values a = 0.5 and p = 1.0 for the period January 
1991-JunelOctober 1997. Since we  are interested in the conditional inno- 
vations of the fundamentals-more  precisely, in comparing those innova- 
tions before and after the devaluation of December 1994-the  plots of the 
first differences are the objects of greatest interest.25  Visual inspection of 
the plots suggests, first, that the volatility of the virtual fundamentals of 
the Mexican peso increased markedly following the December 1994 deval- 
23. All  the data for this exercise were extracted from the IMF’s International  Financial 
Statistics.  For a few series-e.g.,  industrial production  indexes-the  latest observations at 
the time of writing were for June 1997. 
24. We  also used the monetary base to conduct this analysis. The results were essentially 
the same. 
25. If the fundamentals follow a random walk-as  conventional unit-root tests applied to 
high-frequency data on the underlying variables typically suggest-then  the first difference 
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Table 6.5  Fundamental Volatility of the Mexican Peso, 1991-97 (monthly data) 
Standard Deviation of First Differences 
Full period  Predevaluation  Postdevaluation  Volatility 
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"Ratio of sample standard deviations for the two subperiods (postdevaluation/predevaluation). 
*The null hypothesis of equal volatility in the two subperiods cannot be rejected at the 0.05 confidence 
level (0.05 critical value for F(30,50) is 1.7). 
uation; second, that the volatility of the augmented traditional fundamen- 
tals was also higher in the period  following the devaluation; and, third, 
that the volatility of the traditional fundamentals did not change systemat- 
ically after the adoption of a floating exchange rate. The first and last 
features are broadly in line with the findings of Flood and Rose (1995) for 
their sample of eight OECD economies (and the first is also consistent 
with our earlier analysis of the volatility of the peso-dollar rate). However, 
the second feature-the  fact that the volatility of ATF increased after the 
devaluation-seems  at odds with the results obtained by Rose (1994) and 
Flood and Rose (1995). 
The information contained in these plots can be analyzed more rigor- 
ously with the help of table 6.5. The table presents estimates of the stan- 
dard deviations of the first differences of VF, ATF, and TF for the whole 
period, as well  as for the periods before and after the December  1994 
devaluation, for different values of the parameters (Y  and p. In addition, 
the last column contains estimates of the ratio of the standard deviations 
of the first differences of fundamentals in the period following the devalua- 
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variables in the period prior to the devaluation.26  The estimates in the table 
support our interpretation of the plots in figure 6.4. The sample standard 
deviations show a marked increase in the level of volatility in the series of 
VF and ATF since the devaluation of December 1994 for all values of 01 
and similar levels of volatility across periods for all the series of TF. In 
fact, the estimates of the “volatility ratio” in the last column of table 6.5 
indicate that the null hypothesis of no increase in conditional volatility 
during the float is rejected for all the VF series and all the ATF series at 
any reasonable level of statistical confidence, while such a hypothesis can- 
not be rejected for any of the TF series. This basic result did not change 
when we  computed the standard deviations (and the volatility ratio) ex- 
cluding December 1994 and some or all of the observations for 1995 from 
the second subsample-although  in these cases the increases in the level 
of volatility of the VF and ATF series were considerably ~maller.~’ 
These results suggest that in contrast with the OECD experiences exam- 
ined by Flood and Rose (1995), the increase in the level of volatility of the 
virtual fundamentals of the peso-dollar rate during the first three years of 
the float was accompanied by an increase in the level of volatility of (some) 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Put differently, in the case of Mexico the 
evidence from  1995-97  does not rule out completely the possibility that 
the determinants of nominal exchange rate volatility were macroeconomic 
in nature. That said, the evidence also indicates that the likely sources of 
the increase in  macroeconomic volatility in  that period  were shocks to 
(relative) money demand-which,  as we  noted earlier, is the only differ- 
ence between TF  and ATE We find this quite interesting. More unstable 
(less stable) money demand would normally call for some change in the 
operating procedures of monetary policy, especially when the shocks are 
“permanent” (regime-specific) in nature and when those procedures entail 
some type of targeting of monetary aggregates. According to the evidence 
above, however, Mexico’s monetary policy-crudely  proxied by the behav- 
ior of TF-did  not seem to change significantly after the country adopted 
a floating exchange rate regime in  1995. In principle, this would tend to 
undermine the effectiveness of monetary policy, in particular its ability to 
achieve the desired combination of inflation and output outcomes, and 
may be a factor behind the anomalies in the behavior of the peso-dollar 
rate discussed earlier in this section. The finding could also be taken as 
26. Following Flood and Rose (1995) we report the ratio of standard deviations rather 
than the corresponding F-statistics to highlight those cases where fundamental volatility was 
actually lower during the float than in the previous period. The relevant F-statistic can be 
obtained by squaring the ratio presented in the table (provided that the ratio is greater than 
one). Of course, the ratio of regime-specific  sample variances that will  be obtained by  this 
procedure, suitably adjusted by  degrees of freedom, will be distributed as Fonly if the first 
differences of the fundamentals are normally distributed (which may not be the case). 
27. To conserve space, these results are not reported in table 6.5. They are available on re- 
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evidence that the BOM continued to take into account the behavior of the 
exchange rate in conducting monetary policy in the months that followed 
the December 1994 devaluation. We explore this issue in greater detail in 
section 6.4. 
6.4  The Bank of Mexico and the Peso-Dollar Rate in 1995-97 
The peso devaluation of December 1994 imparted a severe blow to the 
credibility of the BOM. The damage became acutely apparent in the first 
quarter of 1995, when uncertainties about Mexico’s capacity to redeem in 
full its large stock of  short-term debt and about its authorities’ resolve 
to confront the crisis led to an enormous depreciation  of  the peso that 
rendered obsolete the monetary program announced by the BOM in mid- 
January. A critical turning point was reached in March and April, follow- 
ing  the  securing  of  the  US$52  billion  international  support  package 
arranged by the IMF  and the U.S.  Treasury and the authorities’ announce- 
ment of a revised (and more realistic) set of macroeconomic policies and 
targets for 1995. The draconian tightening of monetary policy that accom- 
panied these developments-with  Cetes interest rates remaining above 70 
percent for several weeks-put  an end to the freefall of the peso and grad- 
ually restored calm to financial markets. 
From then on, the BOM confronted the arduous task of  restoring its 
tarnished credibility. To  this effect, its authorities reiterated publicly and 
repeatedly that the primary objective of its monetary policy was to arrest 
the inflationary effects of the peso depreciation and to rapidly bring infla- 
tion down to moderate levels, that the exchange rate and interest  rates 
would be freely determined by market forces, and that they would refrain 
from imposing any type of control or restriction on capital movements. 
The BOM also made it clear that other (secondary) objectives of its mone- 
tary policy were to prevent  “excessive” fluctuations in the value of the 
peso, to rebuild its stock of international reserves, and to provide limited 
(and mainly technical) assistance in the restructuring of the badly dam- 
aged banking system. To underscore its resolve to increase the transpar- 
ency of its actions and policies, the BOM made available to market ana- 
lysts and the public at large timely information on its balance sheet and 
other monetary and financial indicators and stepped up its efforts to dis- 
seminate and explain the (various) initiatives being adopted to deal with 
the unfolding crisis in the banking system. 
Financial analysts and other observers of the Mexican economy gave a 
lukewarm reception to these bold initiatives and, throughout 1995, raised 
repeated  objections to the BOM’s monetary policy. Some criticized the 
(revised) annual inflation target of 42 percent-on  the grounds of its being 
either unambitious or unattainable. Others questioned the overall policy 
framework, in particular, the BOM’s decision to adopt-and  its intention 220  Sebastian Edwards and Miguel A. Savastano 
to abide by the rules of-a  floating exchange rate. The arguments offered 
in support of these criticisms were quite unwieldy. The most sophisticated 
observers based their assessment of the stance (and likely consequences) 
of the BOM’s monetary policy on mechanical applications of the quantity 
theory of money, variants of interest rate parity conditions, or simple PPP- 
based calculations. Others, a vast majority, based their objections on anec- 
dotal evidence, personal intuition, and noneconomic considerations. 
Sometime in  1996 the tenor of the concerns about Mexico’s monetary 
policy started  to change. The numerous  worst-case  scenarios  advanced 
in  1995 were shelved one after another in light  of  a series of favorable 
developments including a steady fall in the rate of inflation,28  signs of an 
early rebound in output growth, the turnaround of the external current 
account balance,  the repayment  in full of the stock of Tesobonos, and 
Mexico’s successful reentry  into international capital markets.29  At this 
point, a more constructive debate about the actual priorities and operating 
procedures of the BOM’s monetary policy took center stage. In particular, 
as noted  in section 6.3, a number  of analysts started  to argue that the 
BOM was gearing its monetary policy, through changes in short-term in- 
terest rates, to maintaining an artificially strong peso. Underlying this view 
was the observation that since mid-1 995, periods of relative nominal ex- 
change rate stability and falling interest rates had been interrupted by epi- 
sodes of exchange rate depreciation  and interest rate rises that were re- 
versed quickly and, hence, did not serve to arrest the real appreciation of 
the peso (see fig. 6,6).30 
Throughout  1996-97  the BOM  systematically  dismissed  these  argu- 
ments, considering them misguided and unfounded. Specifically, the BOM 
maintained the position that its monetary policy was not geared toward 
attaining or maintaining any particular  level of the exchange rate or of 
interest rates, that these variables were freely determined by market forces, 
and that its monetary policy actions were guided solely by the dual objec- 
tives of securing its annual inflation target and ensuring orderly function- 
ing of the money and foreign exchange markets (Gil-Diaz 1997). But the 
28. The monthly rate of CPI inflation peaked at 8 percent in April  1995, averaged 2.5 
percent from June 1995 to April 1996, and stayed below 2 percent from May to November 
1996. The twelve-month rate of inflation peaked at 52 percent in December 1995 and fell 
steadily thereafter. 
29. On Mexico’s cxternal debt strategy following the 1994 crisis, see Andrews and Ishii 
(1995) and IMF  (1996). For an overview of the main macroeconomic developments in Mex- 
ico in 1995 and early 1996, see OECD (1996). 
30. Fig. 6.6 shows that from late 1995 to September 1997 it is possible to identify visually 
at least six episodes, or cycles, of “spikes” in the nominal exchange rate and interest rates 
followed by  relatively long periods of exchange rate stability and falling interest rates; the 
approximate starting date of these episodes were October-November  1995, February-March 
1996, June-July  1996, October 1996, March 1997, and June 1997. The figure also shows that 
over time, the spikes became smaller in  size and there was some upward ratcheting in the 
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Fig. 6.6  Daily peso-dollar rate and daily Cetes rate (secondary market) 
debate on what the BOM really did continued. On 3 October 1997, J. P. 
Morgan’s Emerging Markets Data Watch noted: “It has often been argued 
in the past year or two that Banxico has been exacerbating upward pres- 
sure on the peso by tightening monetary policy” (6), and David Malpass, 
chief economist of  Bear Stearns, stated in the  Wall Street Journal that 
“Mexico stopped its economic and financial deterioration almost over- 
night [in the aftermath of the 1994 devaluation] by announcing a feedback 
mechanism between the exchange rate . . . and . . . monetary liquidity.”” 
Central banks often act in ways that do not exactly correspond to their 
pronouncements. Notwithstanding the emphasis that the recent literature 
on central banking places on the transparency of monetary policy,32  there 
is nothing intrinsically wrong or unusual about that type of behavior. In 
fact, a number of analysts have used statistical methods to shed light on 
the systematic component of central banks’ actions that is not reflected in 
their public pronouncements in order to obtain a better understanding of 
what it is that central banks really do. Taylor’s (1993) analysis of the Fed’s 
behavior since the 1960s is perhaps the best known example of this ap- 
proach. More recently, Clarida and Gertler (1997) tried to infer from the 
31. “Free Float to Disaster,” Wall Street Journal, 20 October 1997, A23. 
32. See, e.g., the discussion in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (1996) and Romer 
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data the way in which the German Bundesbank conducts monetary policy 
and found that in practice, the actual conduct of this policy differed sig- 
nificantly  from  the  official line.33  In Edwards  and Savastano (1998) we 
used high-frequency  (weekly) data to analyze Mexico’s monetary policy 
during the first three years of the float. In the rest of this section we  use 
daily data to investigate the behavior of some key macroeconomic vari- 
ables-including  the behavior of  the monetary  base-in  an attempt to 
shed some light on the operations of the BOM. 
We  acknowledge at the outset that given Mexico’s very limited experi- 
ence with a floating exchange rate regime, the task of identifying what the 
BOM really did in the first three years after the  1994 crash is extremely 
difficult. In fact, those who have undertaken  this type of challenge for 
advanced countries with at least twenty-five years of data have found it to 
be a very “complex issue, one that . . . [their] analysis cannot fully resolve” 
(Clarida and Gertler  1997, 364). But we  consider it a worthy endeavor. 
The rest of the section is divided in two parts: subsection 6.4.1 presents a 
description  and brief  discussion of  the conduct  of monetary  policy by 
the BOM; subsection 6.4.2 undertakes a preliminary examination of the 
behavior of key macroeconomic variables in the days following large de- 
preciations of the peso. 
6.4.1  The Bank of Mexico’s Monetary Policy: The Official View 
At a very general level, the BOM’s approach to monetary policy seems 
quite standard and straightforward. Abiding by its constitutional mandate 
to maintain price stability, at the end of every year the BOM-in  conjunc- 
tion with the rest of the economic team-chooses  and announces an end- 
point inflation target for the following calendar year and specifies a time 
path for the demand for money consistent with that inflation target and 
with the expected evolution of output, interest rates, and other macroeco- 
nomic variables.34  Based on a number of considerations, including its rela- 
tive stability over long periods of time, the monetary aggregate preferred 
by  the BOM is the monetary  base.3s The BOM’s conduct  of monetary 
policy throughout  the year is therefore geared primarily at keeping the 
intermediate target (the monetary base) on (close to) its prespecified path, 
taking due account of new (unexpected) developments in the economy. 
33. Bernanke and Mihov (1997) reached  a similar conclusion  using (slightly) different 
vector autoregression techniques. The Bundesbank’s official view on monetary policy, how- 
ever, has remained the same (see Issing 1997). 
34. The announcement usually takes place in the context of  the presentation to Congress 
of the economic program for the following year, which is spelled out in a document called 
“Criterios Generales de Politica Econ6mica.” 
35. Since the adoption of a system of zero reserve requirements on deposits in the early 
1990s, Mexico’s monetary base is approximately equal to the amount of currency in circu- 
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Seen in  this way,  the BOM’s  approach to monetary  policy resembles a 
conventional  two-stage intermediate target  procedure,  which, given the 
BOM’s revealed preference for the monetary base, can be thought of as a 
framework of “base money targeting.” 
At a more detailed level, however, the BOM’s conduct of monetary pol- 
icy  looks somewhat less conventional.  This is so for two main reasons. 
First, the BOM combines its annual estimates of the demand for monetary 
base and (historical) information on seasonal fluctuations in that mone- 
tary aggregate to produce quarterly, monthly, and dairy estimates of the 
demand for base money. And second, unlike the majority of central banks, 
the BOM does not use short-term interest rates as an operating target to 
guide its daily operations or modify the stance of monetary policy. In- 
stead, since 1995 the BOM has used a system of cumulative balances with 
commercial banks (also known as reserve averaging around zero) to guide 
its daily supply of liquidity to the economy. It is through changes in the 
BOM’s objective for the system’s cumulative balance that the monetary 
authority conveys signals (to banks) about its desired stance of monetary 
policy (see O’Dogherty 1997). 
Strict adherence to this short-term operating procedure implies that in 
“normal” times (days), the BOM’s monetary policy consists mainly of ac- 
commodating or satisfying all the liquidity (currency) demanded by  the 
banks provided that they are in compliance with the existing objective for 
the system’s cumulative balance.36  In those times, BOM actions arguably 
do not exert a major influence on (nor are they influenced by) the ex- 
change rate or interest rates; all movements in these variables are, in prin- 
ciple, market-determined outcomes (Gil-Diaz 1997). According to the of- 
ficial view, the role of the daily estimates of the demand for monetary base 
in normal times is rather limited. Those estimates provide a benchmark 
against which  BOM  officials can compare the amount  of liquidity de- 
manded by the banks on a given day or week, but not much else. The daily 
assessment of  monetary  conditions by  the BOM  board,  the argument 
goes, takes precedence over the (inherently inaccurate) estimates of daily 
money demand when deciding the amount of liquidity the BOM will inject 
into the system. A key premise behind this course of action is, clearly, that 
the banks’ daily demand for liquidity reflects (or provides a better estimate 
of) the “true” demand for monetary base that the BOM has to satisfy to 
ensure orderly functioning of the money market. 
As noted above, however, that operating procedure leaves scope for the 
36. The actual measurement of compliance is a rather complicated process that depends 
crucially on the period over which the cumulative balances are computed (the maintenance 
period) and the net position of individual banks vis-8-vis the BOM. See Aguilar and Juan- 
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BOM  to conduct more  “active” monetary  policy if  it so wishes. Con- 
cretely, if for whatever reason the BOM decides at a given point in time 
that market conditions require or  justify a change in the stance of its mon- 
etary policy, the BOM will signal that decision to the market (more pre- 
cisely, to the banks) by changing its objective for the system’s cumulative 
balance.  Specifically, BOM  officials argue  that they  can  and  will  an- 
nounce, and thereafter enforce, a lower objective for the system’s cumula- 
tive balance if  they want to tighten  the stance of monetary policy and 
a higher objective if they wanted to ease monetary conditions. According 
to their view, these signals-and  the ensuing enforcement of the new ob- 
jectives for the cumulative balance-will  alter the short-run behavior of 
banks and, through their actions, market interest rates in the desired direc- 
tion: that is, interest rates will rise when the BOM tightens its stance and 
will fall in the opposite case. These policy-induced changes in market in- 
terest rates will, in due course, affect the demand for monetary base also 
in the desired direction, thus contributing to eliminate the (perceived) dis- 
equilibrium in the money market (Gil-Dim 1997). 
We will refrain from assessing the analytical consistency of the BOM’s 
view  of monetary policy as described, for example, in the articles cited 
above. We leave that daunting task for another occasion. We will say, how- 
ever, that we find it peculiar that the BOM seems more comfortable casting 
the discussion of its monetary policy over (extremely) short horizons than 
over the longer term (say, six months or a year). All central banks conduct 
day-to-day operations in a number of markets using a variety of (direct 
and indirect)  instruments. Few  of  them  feel compelled to describe the 
nitty-gritty of their daily operating procedures when asked to characterize 
their framework for monetary policy. There are many good reasons for 
this, but, in our view,  none more important than the long and variable 
lags that are normally thought to undermine the short-run effectiveness 
of monetary policy. The BOM’s view of monetary policy as equivalent to 
daily liquidity management turns this old argument on its head. We  are 
also puzzled by the small number of episodes, during 1996-97,  in which 
the BOM acknowledges having modified the stance of its monetary policy, 
and therefore having influenced the short-run behavior of interest rates 
and the exchange rate, in response to market developments. By  its own 
reckoning, the BOM changed  the stance of its monetary policy fifteen 
times between 25 September and 25 December  1995 and eight times be- 
tween December 1995 and November 1996 and kept the stance unchanged 
(at a “neutral” level-i.e.,  a cumulative balance of zero) during the first 
three quarters of 1997 (Gil-Diaz 1997; Aguilar and Juan-Ram6n 1997). It 
follows from this that, according to the BOM, all movements of interest 
rates and the exchange rate in, say, the first semester of 1997 (or in any 
other long period between changes in the BOM’s objective for the system’s 
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policy. Such an implication merits, at least, a closer look at the data. We 
took on the challenge. 
6.4.2  What Did the Bank of Mexico Really Do in 1996-97? 
An Exploratory Investigation 
In this subsection we  use daily data in an effort to gain some under- 
standing of the way in which the BOM conducted monetary policy in the 
immediate postcrisis period. Our analysis relies on high-frequency data 
for two reasons: first, the short period of time elapsed since the adoption 
of the floating system leaves us with no alternative but to use every data 
point available; second, and as noted before, the BOM stated explicitly 
that its monetary policy during 1996-97  was aimed at satisfying the de- 
mand for monetary base on a daily basis. The subsection is organized as 
follows: We  start by  analyzing briefly the evolution of the daily target for 
the monetary base and comparing its behavior to that of the actual mone- 
tary base. This analysis shows that especially during 1997, there were im- 
portant deviations between target and actual base money. We then exam- 
ine the behavior of a number of key variables in the periods surrounding 
thirty large daily peso depreciations. 
Figure 6.7 presents daily data on the evolution of target and actual mon- 
etary base (in billions of pesos) during 1996-97.  The figure shows that 
between January 1996 (the first date for which we  have BOM forecasts of 
the daily demand for monetary base) and the end of January  1997, the 
deviations between these two variables were rather small. Starting in Feb- 
ruary  1997, however, the actual monetary base persistently exceeded the 
estimated (target) base-the  median daily deviation for this period was 
significantly higher than for the January 1996-January  1997 period. The 
BOM explained these discrepancies by arguing that during most of 1997 
the rate of remonetization was stronger than anticipated and that in esti- 
mating the demand for money it had missed important seasonal varia- 
tions, including the surge in the demand for cash during Mother’s Day 
weekend, and the faster than expected rate of growth of GDP during that 
year.37  Figure 6.8 presents the proportional deviations between actual and 
target base-a  variable we have called “excess liquidity.”  Panel A displays 
the actual deviations between actual and target base, while panel B pre- 
sents a detrended excess liquidity index. Both panels, however, tell a similar 
story: the excess liquidity indexes exhibited considerable variability during 
1996-97. An important question is whether these deviations from the daily 
targets for monetary base (released to the public in late 1996 in an effort 
to increase the transparency  of  the  BOM’s monetary  policy) were the 
37. On reactions to the overshooting of  the base money target in early  1997, see, eg, 
“Mexico Central Bank Primes Economy; Critics See Attempt to Sway Elections,” Wall Street 
Journal. 21 May  1991. See also a related story in the New York Times, 29 May  1991. 226  Sebastian Edwards and Miguel A. Savastano 
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Fig. 6.7  Actual and target monetary base: daily data, 199697 
result of deliberate policy responses to developments deemed undesirable 
by the BOM-including  exchange rate changes-or  whether they repre- 
sented a combination of noise and the BOM’s stated policy of simply ac- 
commodating banks’ actual demand for liquidity on a daily basis. The 
analysis below addresses precisely this question. 
In table 6.6 we present data on the behavior of a number of key variables 
in the days surrounding thirty large daily depreciations of the peso-dollar 
rate during the period January  1995-November  1997. The first ten epi- 
sodes correspond to the ten largest peso depreciations of  1995, while the 
other twenty consist of the largest depreciations observed during 1996- 
97.38  Column A is the episode’s date; column B is the one-day depreciation 
of the peso; column C contains data on the change (in basis points) in the 
twenty-eight-day Cetes interest rate in the secondary market one day af- 
ter the depreciation episode relative to one day prior to the depreciation; 
column D contains the change in the Cetes primary interest rate in the 
period spanning from the Cetes auction prior to the depreciation to the 
first  auction  after  the  depreciation; column  E  presents  the change  in 
the monetary base that had been programmed (estimated) to take place in 
the period spreading from the day prior to the depreciation to five days 
38. This allowed us to have episodes from all three years. Since the exchange rate was 
significantly more volatile in 1995 (see section 6.3),  had we chosen the thirty largest deprecia- 
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Fig. 6.8  Excess liquidity index: (A)  daily data and (B)  detrended, 
daily data, 1996-97 
after the depreciation; column F is the actual change in the monetary base 
during the same period; and column G presents  the change in  the de- 
trended liquidity index in the five days following the depre~iation.~~ 
The information  contained in table 6.6 is  a first step in the effort to 
elucidate the behavior of the BOM in the first three years of the float. We 
39. The data on the 1995 episodes are restricted to exchange rate and Cetes interest rate 
movements because data on the BOM's daily estimates of the monetary base for 1995 (if 
they exist) were not made available to us. Table 6.6  Ten Largest Peso Depreciations of 1995 and Twenty Largest Peso Depreciations from January 1996 to November 1997 
Change in Cetes  Auction-to-auction  Programmed  Actual Change  Detrended 
Rate from  Change in  Change in  in Monetary  Cumulative Excess 
Depreciation  Previous Day  Cetes Rate  Monetary Base  Base over  Liquidity over 
Date  (“w  (basis points)  (basis points)  over 5 Days  5 Days  5 Days 
A  B  C  D  E  F  G 
3 Jan 1995 
4 Jan 1995 
6 Jan 1995 
10 Jan 1995 
30 Jan 1995 
3 Mar 1995 
9 Mar 1995 
15 Mar 1995 
26 Oct 1995 
8 Nov 1995 
23 Jan 1996 













































-0.00082 2 May 1996  0.81  330  101  575.2  565.9  0.00843 
11 Oct 1996  0.72  105  316  2,607.46  2,498.99  -0.00194 
14 Oct 1996  0.84  190  316  538.36  -208.54  -0.01242 
16 Oct 1996  0.8  260  180  -1,000.5  -2,650.6  -0.02746 
23 Oct 1996  0.77  -  55  164  1,400.36  2,433.37  0.01666 
30 Oct 1996  0.82  220  11  1,232.57  1,329.14  0.00142 
27 Feb 1997  2.23  290  257  1,403.63  1,744.18  0.00361 
28 Apr 1997  1.09  -35  -134  -3,077.0  -3,555.5  0.046 
15 Jul  1997  0.84  125  -53  -  1,777.5  -3,830.3  -0.02609 
29 Aug 1997  0.8 1  35  -  206  187.74  86.2  -0.00245 
23 Oct 1997  1  .oo  155  368  2,670.19  4,004.68  0.01479 
24 Oct 1997  1.01  335  368  3,100.09  5,309.37  0.02542 
27 Oct 1997  6.24  375  368  1,885.79  4,110.53  0.02632 
30 Oct 1997  1.08  55  -199  2,376.86  3,102.17  0.00682 
6 Nov 1997  0.79  310  222  3,138.21  2,909.63  -0.00603 
7 Nov  1997  1.67  30  222  3,554.94  4,230.98  0.00489 
12 Nov  1997  1.08  20  -  82  2,608.33  4,970.69  0.02654 
23 Sep 1997  0.89  -  55  -  26  556.02  750.93  0.00121 230  Sebastian Edwards and Miguel A. Savastano 
are particularly interested in understanding the behavior of interest rates 
and of the monetary base in the days following a large depreciation. If the 
BOM was concerned  about the value of the peso, we  would expect the 
monetary base to fall in the days following a sharp exchange rate jump; 
likewise, we  would  expect an increase in  nominal  interest  rates during 
those periods.40  In analyzing this table it is useful to consider three subper- 
iods. The first covers 1995, a year of great turbulence in Mexico’s foreign 
exchange  market.  The second  period  runs  from January  1996 through 
mid-1997 and corresponds to the period when, according to many private 
analysts, the BOM geared its policy toward maintaining a stable peso. The 
final period covers the latter part of  1997, when the BOM became less 
reluctant to let the peso depreciate (Edwards and Savastano 1998). 
Several interesting facts emerge from this table. First, in twenty-two of 
the thirty episodes there is an increase in the auction-to-auction primary 
Cetes interest rates. Second, and highly related, in twenty-six of the thirty 
episodes the secondary market Cetes interest rate rises in the day following 
the depreciation. A possible  explanation for these  results-and  one we 
explore in greater detail in Edwards  and Savastano (1998)-is  that the 
BOM reacted to (relatively) large losses in the value of the peso by tight- 
ening liquidity relative to its daily target, thus putting upward pressure on 
interest rates. The BOM has acknowledged that it indeed tightened liquid- 
ity in the periods following some, but not all, of these depreciation  epi- 
sodes. For example, on 9 November  1995 the BOM lowered significantly 
its objective for the system’s cumulative balance-a  measure that at least 
according to the official view, would signal a willingness to relax (rather 
than tighten) the monetary stance. A similar measure was taken in 23 and 
25 January 1996 (Aguilar and Juan-Ramon 1997). Interestingly, however, 
the BOM denied that it systematically tightened  liquidity in response to 
large peso depreciations during this period and also that it defended or 
targeted any particular level of the peso-dollar rate. Moreover, as noted 
before, according to official pronouncements, there was no change in the 
stance of monetary policy (exchange rate motivated or not) between Octo- 
ber  1996 and November  1997. The BOM’s (semi)official explanation for 
the apparently systematic relation between peso depreciations and interest 
rate rises captured in table 6.6 is that the increases in (Cetes) interest rates 
are market-determined  outcomes; concretely, they are simply a reflection 
of a higher expectation of depreciation in the context of interest arbitrage 
conditions. One problem with this explanation is that it requires the pub- 
lic’s expectations  of peso depreciation  to exhibit some degree of persis- 
tence; econometric analysis of the time-series properties of (actual) daily 
depreciations, however, suggests strongly that they were “white noise” dur- 
ing 1996-97. 
40. Naturally an increase in interest rates could also reflect an increase in the expectations 
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Columns E, F,  and G in table 6.6 help to shed some light on monetary 
policy in the periods surrounding large peso depreciations. We are particu- 
larly interested  in  comparing the actual monetary  stance taken by  the 
BOM in the days following these depreciations with the policy implied by 
the original forecasts. We compared the cumulative targeted and cumula- 
tive actual increases in the monetary base five, ten, and fifteen days follow- 
ing each depreciation episode. Interestingly enough, these figures suggest 
an important change in behavior in late September 1997, when the BOM 
signaled that it would be willing to adopt a more relaxed monetary stance. 
As may be seen, between January 1996 and August 1997-a  period that 
has  been  characterized  as more  “conservative”-monetary  policy was 
tighter than programmed in eight of the twelve depreciation episodes. We 
can also see that after September 1997, following the BOM announcement 
of a more relaxed monetary stance, the pattern of base money tightening 
following a large depreciation all but disappeared. Although this analysis 
is very preliminary and does not control for the potential role of other 
variables, it does suggest that from January 1996 to September 1997 the 
BOM did take into account the behavior of the peso when deciding how 
much liquidity to provide, every day, to the banking system. In Edwards 
and Savastano (1998) we explore this issue further and conclude, based on 
results from various econometric tests, that during 1996-97  the BOM in- 
deed had a feedback rule linking the rate of expansion of base money to 
the rate of depreciation of the peso. 
6.5  Concluding Remarks 
The Mexican peso crisis of December  1994 shocked politicians, ana- 
lysts, and pundits. Many asked how a country wildly hailed as an example 
of  economic strength could collapse so rapidly. Shock was followed by 
panic, as domestic and international investors flew the country and tried 
to undo their positions. As  1995 unfolded it seemed increasingly clear 
that default on the rapidly maturing Tesobonos was more than a distant 
possibility. It took a massive bailout package put together by the IMF  and 
the U.S. Treasury to generate some tranquility in the markets in mid- to 
late 1995. 
From early on the Mexican authorities stated that stabilizing the value 
of the peso, within the context of a freely floating exchange rate regime, 
was one of their most important policy objectives. During most of 1995 
this objective seemed highly elusive. Starting in  1996, however, the peso 
began to exhibit an impressive degree of stability. So much so that a num- 
ber of analysts in the media and in academic and financial circles began 
to wonder whether this stability was consistent with a freely floating re- 
gime. Some even argued that it was “deja-vu all over again” and that the 
BOM was manipulating monetary policy in order to maintain artificially 
a strong peso. At the core of this concern was the notion that by following 232  Sebastian Edwards and Miguel A. Savastano 
this policy the BOM was setting the stage for another round of currency 
overvaluation that would end in a crash. 
In this paper we  have tried  to explain the relative stability exhibited 
by the peso-dollar nominal exchange rate since late 1995. Specifically, we 
approached this issue from two main angles: First, we  asked whether the 
behavior of the peso-dollar  rate since 1995 is broadly comparable to or 
consistent  with the behavior  of a “typical” floating exchange rate. Our 
answer to this question was a qualified yes. Second, we  focused on thirty 
large one-day depreciations to ascertain whether the BOM reacted in a 
systematic manner to those events. Our answer to this question was an- 
other qualified yes, but perhaps more strongly qualified than the first one. 
We  address the first question in section 6.3, where we  used standard 
measures of exchange rate volatility (the mean absolute value of percent- 
age changes and the standard deviation of percentage changes) to com- 
pare the behavior of the peso-dollar rate from 1991 to 1997 with that of 
seven other floating exchange rates-all  of them from industrial countries. 
We conducted the comparison at daily, weekly, and monthly frequencies 
for every year and checked whether the “calendar-year window” imposed 
arbitrary restrictions on the distribution of exchange rates that may pre- 
vent us from detecting important peculiarities in the behavior of the Mexi- 
can peso. The two most interesting findings from this exercise were, first, 
that the degree of volatility of the Mexican peso in 1995 was an order of 
magnitude higher than that of the typical floating exchange rate and, sec- 
ond, that in 1996-97  the degree of volatility exhibited by the Mexican peso 
was broadly in line with that of the seven other currencies in the sample. 
The first finding simply reflects that the financial mayhem that beset 
Mexico in 1995 turned the peso into a complete outlier in terms of volatil- 
ity. This suggests to us that in periods when the fundamental issue is lack 
of confidence in the government’s response to an external liquidity crisis- 
that is, in periods of widespread panic-there  are simply no good yard- 
sticks for assessing the behavior of floating exchange rates. The fundamen- 
tal priority in those periods is to arrest the freefall of the currency through 
a credible tightening of monetary policy. The second finding, on the other 
hand, suggests that the relative stability of the Mexican peso in 1996-97 
was not “excessive” or grossly at odds with the behavior of other floating 
rates. True, the peso was less volatile than the currencies of countries widely 
regarded as having the “cleanest” floats (the G-3 and the United King- 
dom), but it was as or more volatile than other floating exchange rates. 
In the second part of section 6.3 we applied the methodology developed 
by  Flood and Rose (1995) to examine the relation between nominal ex- 
change rate  volatility  and  macroeconomic  volatility in  several OECD 
countries to the case of Mexico. Our results suggest that unlike the OECD 
experiences, the increase in volatility of the peso-dollar rate under the cur- 
rent float was accompanied by an increase in the volatility of some macro- 
economic fundamentals. We  took this as an indication that the evidence The Mexican Peso in the Aftermath of the 1994 Currency Crisis  233 
did not rule out the possibility that the determinants of nominal exchange 
rate volatility in Mexico between 1995 and 1997 were indeed macroeco- 
nomic in nature. It also left open the possibility that the observed behavior 
of the peso-dollar rate was indeed related to the conduct of monetary policy. 
In section 6.4 we  looked in some detail at the relation between exchange 
rate changes and monetary policy. There are three reasons why we  thought 
this question was interesting: First, throughout 1996-97  the BOM denied 
emphatically that it relied on any type of  feedback rule or mechanism 
linking the exchange rate to monetary policy.  Interestingly, it did so in 
response to both criticism and praise from outside observers of the alleged 
use of such a feedback rule since the adoption of the float. Second, many 
observers were  mystified by  the  BOM’s  pronouncements  regarding the 
way in which it conducts monetary policy. In particular, it is peculiar that 
the BOM (in its official and semiofficial pronouncements) treats its day- 
to-day liquidity management operations as equivalent to its framework 
for monetary policy-rather  than as an important but secondary part of 
it, as most central banks do. And third, and related to the other two, the 
BOM not only frames its discussion of monetary policy over extremely 
short horizons, but it allegedly relies on daily estimates of the demand 
for monetary base produced at the beginning of  each year to guide its 
monetary policy. 
To  address the question, What did the BOM really do in  1995-97?  we 
looked at the behavior of interest rates and base money in the period sur- 
rounding thirty large daily depreciations of  the peso during those years 
(daily depreciations that range from 0.7  to 9 percent). In our view, the 
results from this analysis provide some preliminary support for the conjec- 
ture that during the period under consideration, the BOM took into ac- 
count the short-run behavior of the nominal exchange rate for conducting 
monetary policy. This conjecture is also consistent with results obtained 
from time-series analysis with high-frequency data that are reported  in 
Edwards and Savastano (1998). Although it is too early for a final verdict, 
the evidence examined suggests that in spite of its shortcomings, Mexico’s 
monetary policy between 1995 and 1997 contributed to the achievement 
of two key policy objectives: it helped to arrest the freefall in the value of 
the peso while allowing a considerable degree of exchange rate flexibility, 
and it helped to reduce inflation at a pace that very few observers deemed 
achievable by mid-1995. 
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Comment  J.  Bradford De Long 
Sebastian Edwards and Miguel Savastano make four major points: 
Throughout 1993-94  most available information suggested that things in 
Most analysts, however, completely missed the magnitude of the disequi- 
Mexico were getting badly out of hand. 
librium-and  thus the magnitude of the crisis. 
J. Bradford De Long is professor of  economics at the University of California, Berkeley, 
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The nominal stability of  the peso during 1996-97  has been a source of 
alarm: will “it” happen again? 
Has the Bank of  Mexico’s monetary  policy been geared toward main- 
taining a degree of nominal exchange rate stability at odds with the 
requirements of the floating rate regime? No. The Bank of Mexico ap- 
pears to have been using a feedback rule that takes account of  the be- 
havior of the nominal exchange rate. But Mexico’s exchange rate be- 
havior has been largely consistent with a (dirty, but not badly soiled) 
float. 
As I read this paper, I became more and more impressed by the work 
that Edwards and Savastano put into it, and less and less impressed at our 
collective understanding of Mexico 1994-95-why  it happened, what it 
was, and what the chances are that it will happen again. They have done 
a very good job, yet I find myself feeling like-there  is a “Far Side” car- 
toon, of  dogs in lab coats, captioned, “Dog scientists trying to discover 
the doorknob principle,” an image that will resonate strongly with anyone 
who has had a dog and watched it try to open a door. 
They begin their paper by  trying to debunk pieces-opposed  pieces- 
of  “conventional wisdom” that have become common rhetorical moves 
made either in looking back at Mexico 1994-95  or in looking across the 
Pacific at East Asia today. The first piece of conventional wisdom is that 
the peso crisis occurred because the Mexican government (assisted, of 
course, by its lackeys in the U.S. Treasury) lied about-concealed-hid- 
information about the state of its economy and that when investors discov- 
ered all was not pure, they recoiled in horror. Edwards and Savastano have 
very little patience with this view, for which I thank them. 
They also have little patience with the other-opposed-piece  of con- 
ventional wisdom: that  Mexican policymakers were  simply doing their 
jobs, and doing reasonably well at their jobs, when by  bad luck the roof 
suddenly fell in. They write: “The Mexican authorities seriously underesti- 
mated the risks embedded in their chosen course of action. It is quite a 
stretch to claim . . . that this error in judgment . . . does not fall squarely 
in the category of policy mistakes.” In other words, because Mexican eco- 
nomic policy led to catastrophe-did  not keep the roof from falling in- 
Mexican economic policy was catastrophically awry. 
From one perspective this position is clearly correct. Catastrophe hap- 
pened. Policies to avoid it were not adopted. This was a policy catastrophe. 
From another perspective it is unsatisfactory. The most interesting thing 
about the recent Mexican crisis was that the Mexican government’s sins 
against the gods of monetarism seemed at the time-seem  now-to  have 
been  relatively  small.  The  magnitude  of  fundamental  disequilibrium 
seemed at the time relatively small. Yet  the punishment was  swift, sure, 
deadly, and catastrophic: I do not know how deep Mexico’s  1995-96  de- 238  Sebastian Edwards and Miguel A. Savastano 
pression would have been in the absence of IMF and (rather hastily paid 
back) U.S. Treasury support. I fear it would have been deep and long. 
Now we do have models in which relatively small “fundamental disequi- 
libria” can be followed by  large currency collapses. But these are models 
of fiscal crisis (in which the government budget balance moves into mas- 
sive deficit in such a way as to make everyone believe that large-scale mon- 
etization  is likely) or models of policy  fragility  (in which  a sudden fall 
in the currency induces a substantial shift in government policy toward 
accommodation  and monetization).  The Mexican  case  was  neither  of 
these: the government budget was not in substantial deficit; the fall of the 
peso did not lead to a substantial loosening but rather to a tightening of 
policy-interest  rates up to 80 percent. 
Before the fact very, very few saw a crisis of the magnitude that actually 
occurred as even possible. As Edwards and Savastano write: “Very few, if 
any, observers would have predicted that merely a year after abandoning 
the [currency] band, the peso would lose almost one-half of its value. This 
inability to grasp the seriousness of the Mexican situation . . . clearly illus- 
trates  the shortcomings of the models commonly  used  by  both private 
sector  and academic  analysts  to assess the adequacy  of  real  exchange 
rates.” 
They go on to criticize our collective model building, writing: “Indeed, 
most of these models are strictly based on flow considerations. . . . Models 
that, on the other hand, pay  attention  to stocks in  general  and to the 
foreign demand for securities issued by emerging markets in particular are, 
in principle, better equipped to gauge the magnitude of the disequilibrium 
in circumstances where credibility vanishes.” 
But is this correct? What is the fundamental foreign demand for securi- 
ties issued by emerging markets? It depends on risk, covariance with in- 
dustrial  market  returns,  and expected  return-and  expected  return  is 
largely linked  to the expected  future growth  rates  of emerging  market 
economies. 
I  do not know  anyone who has a clear vision  of  the distribution  of 
growth possibilities for emerging market economies. I do not know how 
news about today-about  politics  and economics today-should  affect 
my estimate of the future growth of emerging market economies, and thus 
my fundamental demand for emerging market securities. Nor do I know 
why  a-relatively  minor,  125 basis point-increase  in medium-term real 
interest rates in the United States in 1994 should have had a large effect 
on industrial economy demand for emerging market securities. 
I do know that the amount of capital crossing borders today is smaller, 
relative to the size of the world economy, than before 1914. We have vastly 
more information now than they did then. And our markets and political 
systems are more open and more honest-back  in the old days E. H. Har- 
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clients at the Illinois Central annual meeting, on the ground that even 
though the bylaws of the corporation admitted proxies the laws of the state 
of Illinois did not. That makes me think that “fundamental” demand for 
emerging market securities is considerably higher than the current value 
of  such securities: that capital markets have been liberalized and we  are 
on a trajectory  toward a steady state in which cross-border  investment 
holdings are much larger than they are today. 
I also know that when you do not know much, and when news does not 
teach you much, your  beliefs do not vary much-that  conditional ex- 
pected values are and remain close to the unconditional means of proba- 
bility distributions.  Under such circumstances large swings in the stock 
demand for emerging market securities seem a deep puzzle: if we  know 
next to nothing about long-run returns, how can our demand based on 
expectations of long-run returns suddenly and significantly change? 
And this brings me to the second part of the paper. Edwards and Savas- 
tan0 ask, in essence: Will “it” happen again? Is the Mexican government 
informally pegging its nominal exchange rate in a way  that is leading to 
sustained real appreciation and real overvaluation, thus setting Mexico up 
for a repeat crisis? Some prominent and influential international macro- 
economists who write columns for Business  Week and have the initials 
“R. D.” have worried that it is. Edwards and Savastano analyze this ques- 
tion bycomparing the actual behavior of the Mexican peso over the past 
couple of years to what would have been expected had the currency been 
undergoing a relatively “clean” float. 
Their first problem is that it is not at all clear how a currency undergoing 
a clean float behaves. We have good models of how it should behave. When 
we  test these models, the data rejects them. We have very good normative 
models of exchange rates-but  not good positive models of exchange rates. 
So Edwards and Savastano begin by comparing the short-term variabil- 
ity of Mexico’s exchange rate in  1996-97  to the variability of other ex- 
change rates and find that Mexico is not out of line. They go on to worry 
about  the sudden  shifts in  volatility regime apparently experienced  by 
Mexico-using  the “virtual fundamentals”  methodology  of Flood and 
Rose (although it is not clear to me whether “virtual” is used in the sense 
of “virtual particle,” “virtual reality,” or “virtual presence”). They find- 
in sharp contrast to Flood and Rose, who found that changes in exchange 
rate volatility for OECD countries appeared unconnected with changes in 
macroeconomic volatility-that  the macroeconomics have changed: that 
Mexico’s money demand has become more unstable in the period  since 
the crisis. 
This is very interesting: Flood and Rose, as I understand them, set up 
their model-and  the contrast between traditional and virtual fundamen- 
tals-to  make it as hard as possible for changes in the exchange rate re- 
gime to be paralleled by changes in traditional fundamentals. The point 240  Sebastian Edwards and Miguel A. Savastano 
was to demonstrate the inadequacy of monetary models of exchange rates. 
Yet Edwards and Savastano, using Flood and Rose’s methodology, actu- 
ally find standard monetary models . . . somewhat useful. They also pro- 
vide interesting evidence that the Bank of Mexico has not focused on do- 
mestic conditions entirely but has kept one eye on the exchange rate in 
1996-97-tightening  monetary policy in response to large depreciations 
of the peso. 
How does all this bear on their major question: is “it” likely to happen 
again? Unfortunately, the answer is not clear. The Bank of Mexico appears 
to be following a policy like that of many other countries-float  the ex- 
change rate, but pay some (but not exclusive or even primary) attention 
to the exchange rate in setting monetary policy. There is no reason why 
such a feedback rule should lead to a period of pronounced real overvalu- 
ation followed by  a currency crash. But then a year before the 1994-95 
collapse of the peso there seemed to be no fundamental reason for the 
peso to undergo a catastrophic collapse either. 